



In (3) the modal operator is represented syntactically. I follow Hacquard (2006, 2010), in assuming that modals are relative to an event – rather than a world - of evaluation and that a modal operator has an event variable that must be bound locally. The modal in (3) is restricted by an epistemic modal base that is relativized to the speaker and the speech time (the agent and temporal trace of the speech event). This is captured in (3) where the variable  $e_0$  from the modal base is co-indexed with a speech event represented syntactically (c.f. Hacquard (2010)). The  $CON(e_0)$  relation picks out a set of propositions that provide the doxastic alternatives of the agent of  $e_0$  at the time of  $e_0$ . In EFI this accessibility relation is further modified by a proposition denoted by a TP with imperfective AspP in its scope ( $TP_1$  in (3)). Hence, the proposition “Piotr broke up with a girlfriend” is added to the set of beliefs. Finally, in the nuclear scope of the Modal in (3) I locate the proposition that answers the question from the discourse topic. I encapsulate the result of applying the denotation of modal R to its two arguments in the following proposal:  $[Mod]^{w,e} = \lambda P_{\langle st \rangle} \lambda Q_{\langle st \rangle}. \forall w'. P(w') = 1 \cdot Q(w') = 1$

Mod = in all the worlds  $w'$  that are compatible with the CONTENT of the speech event, the proposition Q is true. If Piotr broke up with a girlfriend in all of the speaker’s doxastic alternatives, then in all the worlds compatible with what the speaker knows Piotr is the best person to give Tomek advice.

My analysis correctly predicts that that a perfective TP cannot replace the imperfective  $TP_1$  in (3) without creating uninterpretability.  $CON(e)$  is defined when  $e$  has a propositional content (for example when  $e$  is an event like *believe*; c.f. Hacquard (2010)); hence, it must be modified by a proposition (type  $\langle s,t \rangle$ ). Any perfective construction is of the type  $\langle t \rangle$  since its proposition is always bound by a *topic situation*. An utterance with perfective aspect is about a particular actual situation. If such a situation is not explicit, as in (2), it is assumed that the event (Piotr breaking up with his girlfriend) is contained in the situation immediately preceding the utterance time. By contrast, an imperfective construction is of the type  $\langle st \rangle$ : it is infelicitous on its own, as its proposition is not bound by a *topic situation*. In order to make (4A) interpretable, one must either: i) provide a situation that will be contained in the situation over which the imperfective verb predicates (see 4B) or ii) know the discourse topic that will allow to determine the set of beliefs of the discourse participants (see 1).

(4) A. # Piotr **rzucal**<sup>lpf</sup> dziewczynę.

‘Piotr broke up with a girlfriend.’

B. Kiedy go poznałam, Piotr **rzucal**<sup>lpf</sup> dziewczynę.

‘When I met him, Piotr was breaking up with a girlfriend.’

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